## 1NC

### 1

#### The AFF’s attempts to solve violence will inevitably fail – they displace the responsibility from the individuals acting violently under the guise of an inability to alter violence and fail to understand how individuals shape war and violence.

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg.10-11)

Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls ‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally, and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘what would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN – finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution. ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others.’ We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

#### The truth is, we are the violence. Our everyday thinking and willingness to permit violence to permeate our reality creates a norm of violence – individual acceptance of violence in society is the root cause of violence.

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg.9)

war does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilizationwhich make the ;outbreak’ of war**,** of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. ‘We are the war’, writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis at the end of her existential analysis of the question, ‘what is war?’: I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don’t, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values – in short: us. We are the war…and I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen. ‘We are the war’- and we also ‘are’ the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in co-called ‘peacetime’, for we make them possible and we permit them to happen.

#### The Alternative text is to reject the affirmatives representations and reconceive of violence as an issue of personal choice made by individuals.

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg.5-6)

A politics aiming at a change in people’s behavior would require political work that is very much more cumbersome and very much less promising of success than is the use of state power and social control. It would require political consciousness-raising- politicizing the way we think- which cannot be imposed on others by force or compulsory educational measures. It would require a view of people which takes seriously and reckons with their will, both their will to violence or their will to change. To take seriously the will of others however would mean recognizing one’s own, and putting people’s will, including our own, at the centre of political reflection. A political analysis of violence needs to recognize this will, the personal decision in favor of violence- not just to describe acts of violence, or the conditions which enable them to take place, but also to capture the moment of decision which is the real impetus for violent action. For without this decision there will be no violent act, not even in circumstances which potentially permit it. It is the decision to violate, not just the act itself, which make a person a perpetrator of violence-just as it is the decision not to do so which makes people not act violently and not abuse their power in a situation which would nevertheless permit it. This moment of decision, therefore, is also the locus of potential resistance to violence. To understand the structures of thinking and the criteria by which such decisions are reached, but above all to regard this decision as an act of choice, seems to me a necessary precondition for any political struggle against violence and for a non-violent society. My focus then, is on the decision to violate- not just in circumstances where violence is conspicuous by its damage, but in every situation where the choice to violate presents itself. This means a change from the accustomed perspective on violence to the context where decisions for actions are being made, as it were “before” their consequence become apparent, and which we may not recognize as contexts of violence. Our political analysis of sexual or racist violence have necessarily concentrated on situations where the power disequilibrium between perpetrator and victim is extreme, where, in particular, it is supported by social power structures such as male and/or white supremacy, so that not only is the violence unlikely to receive sanctions, but on the contrary, the perpetrator will find support rather than the victim. Violence, however, is a possibility wherever there is freedom of action, however limited. Such violence may ‘look different’, not least because the possibilities or resistance may also be greater in situations where there is relative freedom of action also on the part of the other agent, that is, the violator’s envisaged victim.

### 2

#### Text: The United States Congress should codify a statutory cause of action for nominal damages for those unlawfully injured by targeting killing operations and their heirs.

#### The United States federal government should make all relevant evidence available to the involved parties ex parte and in camera even if it would violate state secrets privilege.

#### CP solves the case – sets a precedent against unlawful drone use while avoiding deference and our case turns

Vladeck 13 (Steve, professor of law and the associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, “Why a “Drone Court” Won’t Work–But (Nominal) Damages Might…”, Feb 10, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/why-a-drone-court-wont-work/>, CMR)

IV. Why Damages Actions Don’t Raise the Same Legal Concerns¶ At first blush, it may seem like many of these issues would be equally salient in the context of after-the-fact damages suits. But as long as such a regime was designed carefully and conscientiously, I actually think virtually all of these concerns could be mitigated.¶ For starters, retrospective review doesn’t raise anywhere near the same concerns with regard to adversity or judicial competence. Re: adversity, presumably those who are targeted in an individual strike could be represented as plaintiffs in a post-hoc proceeding, whether through their next friend or their heirs. And as long as they could state a viable claim for relief (more on that below), it’s hard to see any pure Article III problem with such a suit for retrospective relief.¶ As for competence, judges routinely review whether government officers acted in lawful self-defense under exigent circumstances (this is exactly what Tennessee v. Garner contemplates, after all). And if the Guantánamo litigation of the past five years has shown nothing else, it demonstrates that judges are also more than competent to resolve not just whether individual terrorism suspects are who the government says they are (and thus members of al Qaeda or one of its affiliates), but to do so using highly classified information in a manner that balances–albeit not always ideally–the government’s interest in secrecy with the detainee’s ability to contest the evidence against him. Just as Guantánamo detainees are represented in their habeas proceedings by security-cleared counsel who must comply with court-imposed protective orders and security procedures, so too, the subjects of targeted killing operations could have their estates represented by security-cleared counsel, who would be in a far better position to challenge the government’s evidence and to offer potentially exculpatory evidence / arguments of their own.¶ More to the point, it should also follow that courts would be far more able to review the questions that will necessary be at the core of these cases after the fact. Although the pure membership question can probably be decided in the abstract, it should stand to reason that the imminence and infeasibility-of-capture issues will be much easier to assess in hindsight–removed from the pressures of the moment and with the benefit of the dispassionate distance on which judicial review must rely. To similar effect, whether the government used excessive force in relation to the object of the attack is also something that can only reasonably be assessed post hoc.¶ And in addition to the substantive questions, it will also be much easier for courts to review the government’s own procedures after they are employed, especially if the government itself is already conducting after-action reviews that could be made part of the (classified) record in such cases. Indeed, the government’s own analysis could, in many cases, go along way toward proving the lawfulness vel non of an individual strike…¶ To be sure, there are a host of legal doctrines that would get in the way of such suits–foremost among them, the present judicial hostility to causes of action under Bivens; the state secrets privilege; and official immunity doctrine. But I am a firm believer that, except where the President himself is concerned (where there’s a stronger argument that immunity is constitutionally grounded), each of these concerns can be overcome by statute–so long as Congress creates an express cause of action for nominal damages, and so long as the statute both (1) expressly overrides state secrets and official immunity doctrine; and (2) replaces them with carefully considered procedures for balancing the secrecy concerns that would arise in many–if not most–of these cases, these legal issues would be overcome.¶ V. Why Damages Actions Aren’t Perfect–But Might Be the Least-Worst Alternative¶

Perhaps counterintuitively, I also believe that after-the-fact judicial review wouldn’t raise anywhere near the same prudential concerns as those noted above. Leaving aside how much less pressure judges would be under in such cases, it’s also generally true that damages regimes don’t have nearly the same validating effect on government action that ex ante approval does. Otherwise, one would expect to have seen a dramatic upsurge in lethal actions by law enforcement officers after each judicial decision refusing to impose individual liability arising out of a prior use of deadly force. So far as I know, no such evidence exists. Of course, damages actions aren’t a perfect solution here. It’s obvious, but should be said anyway, that in a case in which the government does act unlawfully, no amount of damages will make the victim (or his heirs) whole. It’s also inevitable that, like much of the Guantánamo litigation, most of these suits would be resolved under extraordinary secrecy, and so there would be far less public accountability for targeted killings than, ideally, we might want. That said, there are two enormous upsides to damages actions that, in my mind, make them worth it–even if they are deeply, fundamentally flawed: First, if nothing else, the specter of damages, even nominal damages, should have a deterrent effect on future government officers, such that, if a targeted killing operation ever was carried out in a way that violated the relevant legal rules, there would be liability–and, as importantly, precedent–such that the next government official in a similar context might think twice, and might make sure that he’s that much more convinced that the individual in question is who the government claims, and that there’s no alternative to the use of lethal force. Second, at least where the targets of such force are U.S. citizens, I believe that there is a non-frivolous argument that the Constitution requires at least some form of judicial process–and, compared to the alternatives, nominal damages actions litigated under carefully circumscribed rules of secrecy may be the only way to get all of the relevant constituencies to the table. That’s a very long way of reiterating what I wrote in my initial response to the DOJ white paper, but I end up in the same place: If folks really want to provide a judicial process to serve as a check on the U.S. government’s conduct of targeted killing operations, this kind of regime, and not an ex ante “drone court,” is where such endeavors should focus.

“drone court,” is where such endeavors should focus.

### 3

#### Obama is winning the fight against a new Iran sanctions bill but PC is key to sustain democratic momentum against its passage

Lockshin 1-21 (Matt, senior campaign manager and online organizer at CREDO Action, “A Big Day for Diplomacy With Iran,” 2014, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-lockshin/a-big-day-for-diplomacy-w_b_4632941.html>

**Monday could go down in history as the day we took our first step toward a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran that prevents the country from** ever **acquiring a nuclear weapon**. But the peaceful resolution of international concerns about Iran's nuclear program is hardly assured.Those of us who support diplomacy have an important role to play in preventing members of the **House and the Senate** -- Democrats and Republicans -- who are **unwilling to give President Obama the** time and political spacenecessary to cut a reasonable deal with Iran. Where We Are Now On Monday, Iran began to implement an interim deal it has made with the United States and our international partners. Iran's nuclear program is now frozen and subject to the most intrusive inspections in history. And for the next six months, while Iran's nuclear program is halted, negotiators will try to reach a comprehensive diplomatic agreement between Iran, the United States and various world powers to prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon. President **Obama has been a strong voice for peace** despite opposition from many within his own party. **Now** more than ever**, he needs** our strong and vocal support. These negotiations represent the best chance in a decade to resolve this issue peacefully. But they will be tough, both substantively and politically. President Obama himself has only given the talks a 50/50 chance of success. The stakes of these talks are high. **The alternative to a negotiated deal will be** either a continually growing Iranian nuclear program or another American war in the Middle East. So **we shouldn't take** **counterproductive actions that make** the **negotiations** even **harder** than they need to be. Yet **that is** precisely what hawks in both chambers of Congress are trying to do. The Biggest Danger to Diplomacy - New Sanctions. Among the leading political dangers to diplomatic talks is the belligerent and reckless move to impose new sanctions on Iran while negotiations are ongoing, in violation of our commitment to our international partners and Iranian diplomats as part of an interim nuclear deal. In December, news broke that 14 Senate Democrats led by New Jersey's Robert Menendez and New York's Chuck Schumer had joined Republicans (led by Senator Mark Kirk of Illinois) in pushing a new sanctions bill (S. 1881) that would blow up diplomacy with Iran and set us on a path to war. Initially, the new sanctions bill seemed to have momentum. But last week the momentum shifted in our favor, due in no small part to those who flooded the Senate with calls demanding that Senate Democrats not help the Republicans start another war. And as of this morning, there are more Senate Democrats on the record opposing new sanctions at this time than there are Democratic co-sponsors of the new sanctions bill. The National Iranian American Council, an organization that does great work supporting diplomacy with Iran, has a nice breakdown of where various senators stand on new sanctions. You can see their whip count, here. The Second Biggest Danger to Diplomacy - Tying President Obama's Hands Iran is currently under an extremely onerous sanctions regime. Sanctions have already crippled the Iranian economy and led to widespread economic pain, like rampant unemployment and shortages of medicine and other humanitarian supplies. While the purpose of sanctions has never been to punish ordinary Iranians, they are the ones who overwhelmingly feel the pain caused by sanctions. It's widely understood that if a deal is struck, the basic contours would be our agreeing to ease sanctions with a goal of ending them in exchange for a verifiable agreement with Iran that prevents it from ever building a nuclear weapon. But some members of Congress want to move the goalposts and are trying to pass legislation that lays out the contours of what an acceptable final deal than ends sanctions would look like -- and the standards they want to establish are so unrealistic that nothing that's actually on the table would ever satisfy them. This kind of legislation is not only dangerous if it passes. Iranian diplomats are less likely to go out on a limb and agree to potentially politically unpopular provisions if they don't believe Congress will back up President Obama by supporting the deal he cuts. The bottom line is that Congress needs to give President Obama the space he needs to cut a reasonable deal. Legislation that seeks to tie his hands not only makes it less likely that diplomacy will succeed (which in turn makes war much more likely), it also makes it more likely that the failure of diplomacy would be blamed (perhaps justifiably) on the United States. What Can We Do Now? The short version is that we need to do all that we can to provide time and space for the administration to negotiate a verifiable deal that protects our interests and advances our security in a peaceful manner. Congress will try to prevent that, and it's our job to ensure that it doesn't. In terms of strategy, we need to keep the pressure on Democrats in both chambers of Congress not to help the Republicans start another war. Senate Democrats are our top targets. Although momentum has slowed on the new Iran sanctions bill, we remain in a dangerous position. If anything goes even a little awry in the ongoing negotiations, then move for new sanctions can quickly regain momentum. Getting more Democratic senators on the record opposing new sanctions now is a priority, as is holding accountable those who are pushing for new sanctions. In the House, we need to make sure Democrats don't give bipartisan support to any bill, even a non-binding resolution, supporting new sanctions or setting down markers about what an acceptable final deal will look like. And Democrats in both chambers need to be reminded that should President Obama cut a reasonable deal with Iran, we will need them to back him up by passing legislation that reduces sanctions in exchange for a verifiable agreement that stops Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear bomb.

#### **Plan destroys Obama**

Loomis 7 Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Department of Government at Georgetown University, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy”, March 2, 2007, pg 36-37, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.

#### Sanction bill guarantees US backing of Israeli strikes on Iran – encourages Israel to act

Perr 12/24/13 – B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University; technology marketing consultant based in Portland, Oregon. Jon has long been active in Democratic politics and public policy as an organizer and advisor in California and Massachusetts. His past roles include field staffer for Gary Hart for President (1984), organizer of Silicon Valley tech executives backing President Clinton's call for national education standards (1997), recruiter of tech executives for Al Gore's and John Kerry's presidential campaigns, and co-coordinator of MassTech for Robert Reich (2002). (Jon, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” Daily Kos, [http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#](http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran)

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran. On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates: If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence. Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July: "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb." Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come." But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway. Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza. That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback? Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

**Global war**

**Trabanco 9** – Independent researcher of geopoltical and military affairs (1/13/09, José Miguel Alonso Trabanco, “The Middle Eastern Powder Keg Can Explode at anytime,” \*\*http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11762\*\*)

In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad's government will certainly respond. A possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe even against American military bases in the regions. **Teheran will** unquestionably **resort to** its **proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah** (or even some of its Shiite allies it has in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) **to carry out attacks** against Israel, America and their allies, effectively **setting in flames** a large portion of **the Middle East**. The ultimate weapon at Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed asphyxiated, that would dramatically increase the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring intense financial and economic havoc upon the West, which is already facing significant trouble in those respects. In short, the necessary conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given. Such **conflict could** rapidlyspiral out of control and thus a relatively **minor clash could** quickly **and** dangerously **escalate by engulfing the whole region and** perhaps even **beyond**. There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their respective allies and some great powers could become involved in one way or another (**America, Russia**, Europe, **China**). Therefore, any miscalculation by any of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that the stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.

### Adventurism

#### Drones don’t cause U.S adventurism---their ev is baseless speculation

Amitai Etzioni 13, professor of international relations at George Washington University, March/April 2013, “The Great Drone Debate,” Military Review, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>

Mary Dudziak of the University of Southern California’s Gould School of Law opines that “[d]rones are a technological step that further isolates the American people from military action, undermining political checks on . . . endless war.” Similarly, Noel Sharkey, in The Guardian, worries that drones represent “the ﬁnal step in the industrial revolution of war—a clean factory of slaughter with no physical blood on our hands and none of our own side killed.”

This kind of cocktail-party sociology does not stand up to even the most minimal critical examination. Would the people of the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan be better off if terrorists were killed in “hot” blood—say, knifed by Special Forces, blood and brain matter splashing in their faces? Would they be better off if our troops, in order to reach the terrorists, had to go through improvised explosive devices blowing up their legs and arms and gauntlets of machinegun ﬁre and rocket-propelled grenades—traumatic experiences that turn some of them into psychopath-like killers?

Perhaps if *all* or *most* ﬁghting were done in a cold-blooded, push-button way, it might well have the effects suggested above. However, as long as what we are talking about are a few hundred drone drivers, what they do or do not feel has no discernible effects on the nation or the leaders who declare war. Indeed, there is no evidence that the introduction of drones (and before that, high-level bombing and cruise missiles that were criticized on the same grounds) made going to war more likely or its extension more acceptable. Anybody who followed the American disengagement in Vietnam after the introduction of high-level bombing, or the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan (and Iraq)—despite the considerable increases in drone strikes—knows better. In effect, the opposite argument may well hold: if the United States could not draw on drones in Yemen and the other new theaters of the counterterrorism campaign, the nation might well have been forced to rely more on conventional troops and prolong our involvement in those areas, a choice which would greatly increase our casualties and zones of warfare.

[Italics in original]

#### Syria proves no U.S. drone adventurism---they’ll never be used against any adversary with a halfway-decent military

Audrey Kurth Cronin 9-2, Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, 9/2/13, “Drones Over Damascus,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139889/audrey-kurth-cronin/drones-over-damascus

For the past four years, Americans have been preoccupied with drone technology as a cheap, low-risk, and discriminate way to eliminate emerging global threats without getting entangled in protracted conflicts. The U.S. government has even dramatically changed its military force structure to make armed drones a lynchpin of U.S. power projection. Yet these weapons have been virtually useless in the last two conflicts that the United States has faced, first in Libya and now in Syria. Why is that?

Broadly speaking, the United States has used armed drone strikes overseas in two ways: during war and to prevent war. Battlefield use of weaponized drones is not new (it dates back to World War I), and is fairly ubiquitous. A spring 2013 report by the U.S. Air Force estimated that unmanned aircraft fired about a quarter of all missiles used in coalition air strikes in Afghanistan in the early part of this year. Drones have proved remarkably effective at providing reconnaissance to U.S. troops on the ground, protecting them from enemy attacks, and reducing civilian casualties. When used within a war, in other words, drones are a great way to give U.S. soldiers an edge.

Armed drones have a preventive role to play, as well. They can keep terrorist threats at bay, and thus reduce the chance that Washington will need to send troops to battle insurgents in faraway places. Since 2009, U.S. counterterrorism efforts have involved hundreds of remote-controlled strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles. These were meant to prevent attacks on the United States and its allies by al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other groups. In these cases, the argument goes, discriminate targeting to prevent such attacks beats invading countries after them.

Prevention has thus become a watchword of U.S. policy, but its logic has rarely been applied to belligerent states. The international community had plenty of warning that the Syrian government might use chemical weapons, and now Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has apparently employed sarin gas to kill thousands of civilians. Photographs of rows of children left dead and videos of civilians running in fear have shocked the world. The last time the gas was used -- in Japan by Aum Shinrikyo, a terrorist group, to kill 13 people on the Tokyo subway -- pales in comparison with the recent slaughter in Syria. Could the United States have deployed its drone fleet to destroy Syrian arsenals or to kill those planning to make use of them before this happened?

The answer is no. Armed drones have serious limitations, and the situation in Syria lays them bare. They are only useful where the United States has unfettered access to airspace, a well-defined target, and a clear objective. In Syria, the United States lacks all three.

First, the airspace. So far, armed drones have been used either over countries that do not control their own airspace (Somalia, Mali, Afghanistan) or where the government has given the United States some degree of permission (Yemen, Pakistan). Those circumstances are rare. When the foe can actually defend itself, the use of armed drones is extraordinarily difficult and could constitute an act of war -- one that could easily draw the United States into the heart of a conflict.

Drones are slow and noisy; they fly at a low altitude; and they require time to hover over a potential target before being used. They are basically sitting ducks. Syria has an air force and air defenses that could easily pick American drones out of the sky. The only real way for the United States to use them would be to first destroy Syrian planes and anti-aircraft batteries. But that would be no different from a full-scale intervention and would negate the tactical advantage of remote strikes. In other words, the conditions under which armed drones are effective as preventive weapons are limited. And the more drones are used for prevention and during war, the more state belligerents will take note of that fact, and will make sure that those conditions are never met on their own territory.

Second, the target. Using armed drones against the Syrian government’s enormous chemical weapons stockpiles would have risked causing the very release of deadly agents that the United States was trying to avoid. Drones are precise but not perfect. Like cruise missiles, their effectiveness mainly depends upon the quality of their targeting information. Worse, an imperfect attack could inadvertently give the Assad government political cover to use the weapons with impunity. Assad could blame the release of chemical weapons on a misfired U.S. drone strike. Since U.S. drones are deeply despised in the Middle East, that argument could enjoy wide hearing.

Perhaps the United States might instead have tried to target chemical weapons delivery systems or tried to kill the people who were loading or moving them. But intelligence has been insufficient for such delicate operations. And even if U.S. officials got it right, a remote drone attack would have risked giving the rebels access to remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons or delivery systems. As the United States knows, some of those group are connected to al Qaeda. In such a mess of a situation, and especially in the presence of Syria’s large arsenal, there is no alternative to putting humans on the ground to secure dangerous, volatile weapons. Drones –- or cruise missiles, for that matter -- cannot do it.

Third, the objective. The United States wants to punish the Assad regime for using chemical weapons against the Syrian people and to prevent them from being used again. Drone attacks are ill suited for this purpose. They are unlikely either to inflict sufficient pain or to deter other tyrants from following Assad’s lead. A broader objective is to reinforce the global norm against the use of chemical weapons, and such a lofty goal can only be accomplished with a robust international response.

In a politically complex environment -- one in which the United States is not at war and the targets are unclear -- armed drones are really not all that useful. They might seem like a cool new tool to many observers and policymakers, but the horrible predicament in Syria reveals the sharp limitations of the technology -- and the serious problem of relying upon it so heavily in the U.S. force structure. Rather than looking for a quick technological fix, U.S. policymakers should invest more in good analysis and robust human assets on the ground, so as to sort friend from foe. The United States can take the pilot out of the aircraft, but it cannot remove human judgment, risk, and willpower from war -- especially if it plans to keep intervening in murky conflicts in the Middle East.

#### US action irrelevant to international norms on drones – other tech proves

**Etzioni 13** – professor of IR @ George Washington (Amitai, “The Great Drone Debate”, March/April, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>, CMR)

Other critics contend that by the United States ¶ using drones, it leads other countries into making and ¶using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK ¶ and author of a book about drones argues that, “The ¶ proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the ¶ precedent that the United States is setting by killing ¶ anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of ¶ secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in ¶ a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are ¶ now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can ¶ be little doubt that the fact that drones have served ¶ the United States well has helped to popularize them. ¶ However, it does not follow that United States ¶ should not have employed drones in the hope that ¶such a show of restraint would deter others. First ¶ of all, this would have meant that either the United ¶ States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either ¶ roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use ¶ bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage. ¶ Further, the record shows that even when the ¶United States did not develop a particular weapon, ¶others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the ¶ development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly ¶ cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind ¶ that the international environment is a hostile ¶ one. Countries—and especially non-state actors—¶ most of the time do not play by some set of selfconstraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ ¶whatever weapons they can obtain that will further ¶their interests. The United States correctly does ¶ not assume that it can rely on some non-existent ¶ implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the ¶ avoidance of new military technology by nation X ¶ or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains ¶ from employing that technology¶ I am not arguing that there are no natural norms ¶ that restrain behavior. There are certainly some ¶ that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of ¶ diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of ¶ mass destruction). However drones are but one ¶step—following bombers and missiles—in the ¶development of distant battleﬁeld technologies. ¶ (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines—¶ are next in line). In such circumstances, the role ¶ of norms is much more limited.

#### Zero risk of indopak war

Kumar, 13 (Sanjay – correspondent for The Diplomat, “Pakistan’s Elections: A Harbinger of Peace on the Subcontinent?”, The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/the-pulse/2013/05/16/pakistans-elections-a-harbinger-of-peace-on-the-subcontinent/>)

Now that we know Nawaz Sharif will succeed Raja Pervez Ashraf as the next prime minster of Pakistan, it’s worth noting that Pakistan has never seen a democratic transition as smooth as the one set to take place between the outgoing Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the newly elected Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, or PML(N).

In its 66-year history as an independent nation, Pakistan has witnessed three military coups and extended rule by army generals. Even today, the nation is plagued by political turmoil. But this year seems to be a new chapter in its turbulent history.

The verdict from the 2013 elections gives the PML(N) 123 seats out of 254 declared results as of Tuesday evening, giving Sharif’s party an unassailable lead over its main rivals, PPP and Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, which had secured 31 and 26 seats, respectively. The electoral results for the final 18 of Pakistan’s 272 National Assembly seats remain unannounced.

The voter turnout this year was impressive, with 60 percent of all registered voters turning up to the polls, up from a 45 percent turnout in the last national elections in 2008. This impressive turnout came despite the threat of violence. More than 150 people lost their lives and scores were injured in attacks by insurgents across the country during the election campaigning period and on election day. This brave statement by the people of Pakistan sends a new message to the outside world and gives hope for peace on the Subcontinent.

In particular, India has a stake in the democratic success of its neighbor, with whom relations have been turbulent. There is widespread hope in India that Sharif, who formed a new Indo-Pakistani relationship in the 1990s, will revive the peace process and improve Islamabad’s ties with New Delhi.

Indian Prime minister Manmohan Singh was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Sharif after his emphatic victory. In a letter, Singh talked about charting a new course for the relationship between the two countries and invited his Pakistan counterpart to visit India.

Sharif reciprocated and emphasized the need for improved relations with India. He further stressed the importance of resolving issues, including Kashmir, through peaceful means. He even informally invited the Indian premier to his inauguration ceremony in Islamabad.

According to veteran Pakistani author and political analyst Ahmed Rashid, circumstances may be more favorable this time for Sharif to improve ties with New Delhi. He writes, “During his two premierships in the 1990s, Sharif made genuine efforts at peace with India but was thwarted by an aggressive and uncompromising army.” But, he continues, “The army—faced with a severe weakening of the state—now seems more amenable to improving relations with New Delhi.”

The Hindu opines that where Sharif “gives most hope is in his strong and unambiguous articulation of better India-Pakistan relations, though this will depend on his stated determination to correct the civil-military imbalance, and reclaim the national agenda from the security establishment. Whether he can succeed is another question, but India will be hoping he will.”

As Pakistan passes through a rough economic patch, deeper engagement with its immediate neighbor will not only give the volatile country increased political stability but will also boost growth. India can play a major role in reviving Pakistan's bankrupt economy as a potential investor.

According to an article published by the New Delhi-based think tank Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), trade between the two South Asian countries could receive renewed impetus under the new regime, barring complications from opposition by the religious right. However, the IDSA article also notes that “one should not expect a lot of change in policies related to terrorism targeted at India or its aversion to India’s presence in Afghanistan.”

Despite skepticism, there is a general mood of optimism in India about the regime change in Pakistan. Just a couple of weeks ago Indian media was full of anti-Pakistan stories in the wake of the attack on Indian prisoner Sarabjit Singh in a Pakistani jail. While most Indian reports were full of jingoism in their coverage of the death of Singh, the election has changed the tone of the discourse.

The optimism stems from Sharif’s earlier initiatives in the 1990s to deepen ties with India. In 1999, he started a bus service that runs between Lahore and New Delhi. Then Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Pakistan in the inaugural bus ride. This bonhomie, however, was short-lived. Later that year hostilities erupted between the two nations at the Kargil sector, when the Pakistani army crossed the Line of Control under the leadership of former military ruler Pervez Musharraf.

The new leadership in Pakistan has a very tough job at hand: alleviate the deep-seated historical fear and mistrust between the two countries.

Likewise, India will have to show maturity in understanding the changing mood and aspirations of the people of Pakistan.

New Delhi needs to recognize that never before has there been such an overwhelming consensus for Pakistan to normalize relations with India. If the leaderships of both countries work hard to tap this desire, they may be able to usher in a new era of peace and progress on the Subcontinent.

### Terror

#### no drone blowback – alt causes inevitable, alternatives worse

**Etizoni 13** 4/30 – director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies and a professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University (Amitai, “Drones: Say it with figures”, 2013, <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2013/04/30/Outside-View-Drones-Say-it-with-figures/UPI-25571367294880/>, CMR)

Attacking drones, the most effective counter-terrorism tool the United States has found thus far, is a new cause celebre among progressive public intellectuals and major segments of the media.¶ Their arguments would deserve more of a hearing if, instead of declaring their contentions as fact, they instead coughed up some evidence to support their claims.¶ One argument that is repeated again and again is that killing terrorists with drones generates resentment from Pakistan to Yemen, thereby breeding many more terrorists than are killed. For example, Akbar Ahmed, a distinguished professor at American University, told the BBC on April 9 that, for "every terrorist drones kill, perhaps 100 rise as a result."¶ The key word is "perhaps"; Ahmed cites no data to support his contention.¶ Similarly, in The New York Times, Jo Becker and Scott Shane write that "Drones have replaced Guantanamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants," citing as their evidence one line Faisal Shahzad, who had tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square, used in his 2010 trial seeking to justify targeting civilians.¶ At the same time, when HBO interviewed children who carry suicide vests, they justified their acts by the presence of foreign troops in their country and burning of Korans.¶ No such self-serving statements can be taken as evidence in themselves.¶ And Peter Bergen, a responsible and serious student of drones, quotes approvingly in The Washington Post a new book by Mark Mazzetti, who claims that the use of drone strikes "creates enemies just as it has obliterated them." Again, however, Mazzetti presents no evidence.¶ One may at first consider it obvious that, when American drones kill terrorists who are members of a tribe or family, other members will resent the United States. And hence if the United States would stop targeting people from the skies, that resentment would abet and ultimately vanish.¶ In reality, ample evidence shows that large parts of the population of several Muslim countries resent the United States for numerous and profound reasons, unrelated to drone attacks.¶ These Muslims consider the United States to be the "Great Satan" because it violates core religious values they hold dear; it promotes secular democratic liberal regimes; it supports women's rights; and it exports a lifestyle that devout Muslims consider hedonistic and materialistic to their countries.¶ These feelings, data show, are rampant in countries in which no drones attacks have occurred, were common in those countries in which the drones have been employed well before any attacks took place, and continue unabated, even when drone attacks are greatly scaled back.¶ As Marc Lynch notes in Foreign Affairs:¶ "A decade ago, anti-Americanism seemed like an urgent problem. Overseas opinion surveys showed dramatic spikes in hostility toward the United States, especially in the Arab world ... It is now clear that even major changes, such as Bush's departure, Obama's support for some of the Arab revolts of 2011, the death of Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, have had surprisingly little effect on Arab attitudes towards the United States. Anti-Americanism might have ebbed momentarily, but it is once again flowing freely."¶ The Pew Global Attitudes Project says anti-American sentiments were high and on the rise in countries where drone strikes weren't employed. In Jordan, for example, U.S. unfavorability rose from 78 percent in 2007 to 86 percent in 2012 while Egypt saw a rise from 78 percent to 79 percent over the same period.¶ Notably, the percentage of respondents reporting an "unfavorable" view of the United States in these countries is as high, or higher, than in drone-targeted Pakistan.¶ In Pakistan, a country that has been subjected to a barrage of strikes over the last five years, the United States' unfavorability held steady at 68 percent from 2007-10 (dropping briefly to 63 percent in 2008), but then began to increase, rising to 73 percent in 2011 and 80 percent in 2012 -- a two-year period in which the number of drone strikes was actually dropping significantly.¶ It is also worth noting that these critics attribute resentment to drones rather than military strikes.¶ Do they really think that resentment would be lower if the United States were using cruise missiles? Or bombers? Or Special Forces?

#### No WMD terrorism – lack of desire and capability – empirically the threat is overblown

Mueller 11. John Mueller, Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, “The Truth About al Qaeda”, 8/2/2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show>, CMR

The chief lesson of 9/11 should have been that small bands of terrorists, using simple methods, can exploit loopholes in existing security systems. But instead, many preferred to engage in massive extrapolation: If 19 men could hijack four airplanes simultaneously, the thinking went, then surely al Qaeda would soon make an atomic bomb. As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included. That probability will remain unchanged unless terrorists are able to increase their capabilities massively -- and obtaining nuclear weapons would allow them to do so. Although al Qaeda may have dreamed from time to time about getting such weapons, no other terrorist group has even gone so far as to indulge in such dreams, with the exception of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which leased the mineral rights to an Australian sheep ranch that sat on uranium deposits, purchased some semi-relevant equipment, and tried to buy a finished bomb from the Russians. That experience, however, cannot be very encouraging to the would-be atomic terrorist. Even though it was flush with funds and undistracted by drone attacks (or even by much surveillance), Aum Shinrikyo abandoned its atomic efforts in frustration very early on. It then moved to biological weapons, another complete failure that inspired its leader to suggest that fears expressed in the United States of a biological attack were actually a ruse to tempt terrorist groups to pursue the weapons. The group did finally manage to release some sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that killed 13 and led to the group's terminal shutdown, as well as to 16 years (and counting) of pronouncements that WMD terrorism is the wave of the future. No elephants there, either.

#### Targeting low-level militants is key to all aspects of counter-terror---in-depth network analysis means the people we target don’t seem important to observers, but they’re actually vital to the effectiveness of terror groups

Gregory McNeal 13, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

This becomes obvious when one considers that national security bureaucrats will look beyond criticality and vulnerability, and also engage in network-based analysis. Network-based analysis looks at terrorist groups as nodes connected by links, and assesses how components of that terrorist network operate together and independently of one another.143 Contrary to popular critiques of the targeting process that liken it to a “haphazardly prosecuted assassination program,” in reality modern targeting involves applying pressure to various nodes and links within networks to disrupt and degrade their functionality.144

To effectively pursue a network-based approach, bureaucrats rely in part on what is known as “pattern of life analysis” which involves “connecting the relationships between places and people by tracking their patterns of life.” This analysis draws on the interrelationships among groups “to determine the degree and points of their interdependence,” it assesses how activities are linked and looks to “determine the most effective way to influence or affect the enemy system.”145 While the enemy moves from point to point, reconnaissance or surveillance tracks and notes every location and person visited. Connections between the target, the sites they visit, and the persons they interact with are documented, built into a network diagram, and further analyzed.146 Through this process links and nodes in the enemy's network emerge.147 The analysis charts the “social, economic and political networks that underpin and support clandestine networks,”148 identifying key decision-makers and those who support or influence them indirectly.149 This may mean that analysts will track logistics and money trails, they may identify key facilitators and non-leadership persons of interests, and they will exploit human and signals intelligence combined with computerized knowledge integration that generates and cross-references thousands of data points to construct a comprehensive picture of the enemy network.150 “This analysis has the effect of taking a shadowy foe and revealing his physical infrastructure . . . as a result, the network becomes more visible and vulnerable, thus negating the enemy’s asymmetric advantage of denying a target.”151

Viewing targeting in this way demonstrates how seemingly low-level individuals such as couriers and other “middle-men” in decentralized networks such as al Qaeda are oftentimes critical to the successful functioning of the enemy organization.152 Targeting these individuals can “destabilize clandestine networks by compromising large sections of the organization, distancing operatives from direct guidance, and impeding organizational communication and function.”153 Moreover, because clandestine networks rely on social relationships to manage the trade-off between maintaining secrecy and security, attacking key nodes can have a detrimental impact on the enemy’s ability to conduct their operations.154 Thus, while some individuals may seem insignificant to the outside observer, when considered by a bureaucrat relying on network based analytical techniques, the elimination of a seemingly low level individual might have an important impact on an enemy organization. Moreover, because terrorist networks rely on secrecy in communication, individuals within those networks may forge strong ties that remain dormant for the purposes of operational security.155 This means that social ties that appear inactive or weak to a casual observer such as an NGO, human rights worker, journalist, or even a target’s family members may in fact be strong ties within the network.156 Furthermore, because terrorist networks oftentimes rely on social connections between charismatic leaders to function, disrupting those lines of communication can significantly impact those networks.157

#### Constraining targeted killing’s role in the war on terror causes extinction

Louis Rene Beres 11, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue, 2011, “After Osama bin Laden: Assassination, Terrorism, War, and International Law,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 93

Even after the U.S. assassination of Osama bin Laden, we are still left with the problem of demonstrating that assassination can be construed, at least under certain very limited circumstances, as an appropriate instance of anticipatory self-defense. Arguably, the enhanced permissibility of anticipatory self-defense that follows generally from the growing destructiveness of current weapons technologies in rogue hands may be paralleled by the enhanced permissibility of assassination as a particular strategy of preemption. Indeed, where assassination as anticipatory self-defense may actually prevent a nuclear or other highly destructive form of warfare, reasonableness dictates that it could represent distinctly, even especially, law-enforcing behavior.

For this to be the case, a number of particular conditions would need to be satisfied. First, the assassination itself would have to be limited to the greatest extent possible to those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state. Second, the assassination would have to conform to all of the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity. Third, the assassination would need to follow intelligence assessments that point, beyond a reasonable doubt, to preparations for unconventional or other forms of highly destructive warfare within the intended victim's state. Fourth, the assassination would need to be founded upon carefully calculated judgments that it would, in fact, prevent the intended aggression, and that it would do so with substantially less harm [\*114] to civilian populations than would all of the alternative forms of anticipatory self-defense.

Such an argument may appear manipulative and dangerous; permitting states to engage in what is normally illegal behavior under the convenient pretext of anticipatory self-defense. Yet, any blanket prohibition of assassination under international law could produce even greater harm, compelling threatened states to resort to large-scale warfare that could otherwise be avoided. Although it would surely be the best of all possible worlds if international legal norms could always be upheld without resort to assassination as anticipatory self-defense, the persisting dynamics of a decentralized system of international law may sometimes still require extraordinary methods of law-enforcement. n71

Let us suppose, for example, that a particular state determines that another state is planning a nuclear or chemical surprise attack upon its population centers. We may suppose, also, that carefully constructed intelligence assessments reveal that the assassination of selected key figures (or, perhaps, just one leadership figure) could prevent such an attack altogether. Balancing the expected harms of the principal alternative courses of action (assassination/no surprise attack v. no assassination/surprise attack), the selection of preemptive assassination could prove reasonable, life-saving, and cost-effective.

What of another, more common form of anticipatory self-defense? Might a conventional military strike against the prospective attacker's nuclear, biological or chemical weapons launchers and/or storage sites prove even more reasonable and cost-effective? A persuasive answer inevitably depends upon the particular tactical and strategic circumstances of the moment, and on the precise way in which these particular circumstances are configured.

But it is entirely conceivable that conventional military forms of preemption would generate tangibly greater harms than assassination, and possibly with no greater defensive benefit. This suggests that assassination should not be dismissed out of hand in all circumstances as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under international law. [\*115]

What of those circumstances in which the threat to particular states would not involve higher-order (WMD) n72 military attacks? Could assassination also represent a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense under these circumstances? Subject to the above-stated conditions, the answer might still be "yes." The threat of chemical, biological or nuclear attack may surely enhance the legality of assassination as preemption, but it is by no means an essential precondition. A conventional military attack might still, after all, be enormously, even existentially, destructive. n73 Moreover, it could be followed, in certain circumstances, by unconventional attacks.

#### Yemen instability won’t cause full collapse or war – history shifts the burden of proof

**Caton 10** Dr. Steve C. Caton is Professor of Contemporary Arab Studies in the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University. Yemen: not on the verge of collapse Posted By Steven C. Caton Wednesday, August 11, 2010 - 2:56 PM Share http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/08/11/yemen\_not\_on\_the\_verge\_of\_collapse

History may provide some perspective. There has been a state or dawlah in Yemen for thousands of years, whether the Sabaean state that built Marib Dam and was the reputed homeland of the Queen of Sheba, or the Islamic state created shortly after the advent of Islam which lasted for a thousand years, or the republican state that came into being in 1962 and has lasted until the present day, despite two bitter civil wars. To be sure, the state has waxed and waned in power and contracted or expanded in territory during this history, and it has faced formidable outside opponents, beginning with the Romans and most recently with al-Qaeda, but it has never fully collapsed or disappeared from the scene. It is unlikely to do so in the present in spite of arguments that the current regime is at a tipping point and about to fall apart because of an unprecedented number of seemingly intractable problems facing it (an ever weakening economy, unsustainable water consumption, projected diminished oil reserves, conflicts between the state and certain regional populations, rampant corruption, and let us not forget al-Qaeda).

To those who would say to me, "How do you know it is not at a tipping point?" I can only respond with, "How do you know that it is?" and remind ourselves of the longue durée of Yemeni history.

But what does it mean to be a "weak state" in contemporary Yemen? Again, some historical perspective is helpful, though thankfully we need not go back three thousand years. When the current president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, came to power in 1978 I remember people taking bets in the country's expatriate community that he would not last a year. Not only has he expanded his own personal power, he has managed to consolidate and broaden the state's presence in the country. In 1978, there were few military checkpoints along Yemen's highways; I could go from the capital, Sana'a, to the western town of Marib and be stopped at most two times along the way by state authorities. Now there are over a dozen such stops and identity papers are checked. Military outposts can be seen on most mountain-tops. And there is an administrative system doing the state's business in even the most far-flung regions of the county. Paved roads, state-run or sponsored schools, clinics, and hospitals represent a different aspect of state power and legitimacy, and perhaps they are more effective in that they penetrate into the everyday lives of people. Usually none of this context is taken into account when the western press glibly asserts that the state can barely control the capital, let alone the hinterlands beyond it.

#### Yemen instability key to US-Saudi military cooperation

**Blanchard 12** Christopher M. Blanchard Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations November 27, 2012 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has been drawn more closely into the affairs of its problematic southern neighbor, as Yemen’s government has struggled to defeat northern Al Houthi rebels amid continuing attacks from a resurgent Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. A Saudi military campaign against Al Houthi fighters along the border in 2009 exposed several weaknesses in U.S.-trained and supplied Saudi military forces, and the unrest in Yemen in 2011 raised the prospect of chaos that could directly destabilize the kingdom. In response, Saudi officials intervened forcefully to direct Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to accept the terms of a GCCnegotiated transition agreement. Whether the agreement will be implemented as planned remains unclear. Saudi authorities pledged $3.25 billion in support to Yemen at the May 2012 Friends of Yemen conference in Riyadh.

Instability in Yemen and the presence there of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are of mutual concern to the United States and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has long sought to shape political and security conditions in Yemen as a means of preventing discrete threats from emerging on the kingdom’s southern flank. Many Yemenis view Saudi involvement in Yemen— particularly Saudi patronage relationships with various Yemeni tribal groups—as an attempt to perpetuate divisions in Yemeni society and prevent a unified Yemen from threatening Saudi interests. At present, there appears to be significant U.S.-Saudi intelligence cooperation with regard to the AQAP threat. Unverified press reports suggest that Saudi intelligence services are using double agents to collect information and sabotage AQAP operations. AQAP’s leadership and many of its senior operatives are Saudis who fled to Yemen after the failure of the 2003-2008 Al Qaeda campaign in the kingdom. Saudi officials in Yemen were targeted in assassinations and kidnappings during 2012.

While recent events suggest that significant changes have occurred in Yemen, the core dilemmas facing the United States look very much the same as they have since Yemeni unification in the early 1990s. Saudi Arabia and the United States share an interest in eliminating transnational terrorist threats in Yemen, but may differ on their preferred ends and means regarding Yemen’s long term stability and development.

#### Solves multiple scenarios for Middle East war and contains Yemen instability

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U.S.-Saudi security cooperation is becoming steadily more important as Iran expands its capabilities for asymmetric warfare in the Gulf, increases its long-range missile forces, and moves toward a capability to build and deploy nuclear weapons. The same is true of the enduring threat from terrorism, dealing with Iraq’s weakness and uncertain political leadership, the problems of Yemen, and instability and piracy in the Red Sea area and Indian Ocean.

The United States needs all the friends it can find in the Gulf. It faces serious uncertainties in reshaping its security posture in the region as its forces depart from Iraq. These include Iraq’s uncertain future political stance and government, the inability to predict Iranian actions and alignments, the uncertain outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and uncertainties surrounding the success or failure of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia and Reshaping the U.S. Strategic Posture in the Gulf

At the same time, several factors are clear. There is no possible “end state” to the U.S. presence in the Gulf nor an end to the need for the strongest possible U.S. security ties to Saudi Arabia and other friendly states in the region.

The United State as must reshape its military posture in the Gulf as it withdraws from the Gulf, as well as reshape its power projection capabilities and contingency plans. It must shape its force posture and cooperation with its regional allies to become more effective in hybrid warfare and in a spectrum of conflicts ranging from covert and proxy warfare to long-range missile defenses and extended regional deterrence—addressing the military side of the risk that Iran may become a nuclear power and giving its allies an incentive not to acquire their own nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

Iran remains an emerging challenge. It is deeply involved in strategic competition with the United States and its friends and allies in the region. It is developing steadily better capabilities to attack shipping, targets in the Gulf, and targets on the Saudi and southern Gulf coast, and it is using asymmetric warfare in doing so. It is fielding significant long-range missile forces and may acquire nuclear weapons.

If the United States is to deter other regional states from proliferation in reaction to Iran, and make its statements about offering “extended regional deterrence” a credible option, it must show it will do its best to create effective regional partners in the southern Gulf, as well as try to build a strategic partnership with Iraq.

At the same time, neither the United States nor its Gulf allies have any reason to seek open confrontation with Iran. This is particularly true of the Gulf states. “Speak softly and carry a big stick” may not be an old Arab proverb, but Arab leaders have long practiced this with considerable success.

The United States can still count on some support from allies like Britain and France, but the fact remains that it will have to rely on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The same forces that have made the United States and Saudi Arabia key de facto partners in Gulf security will become even more important in the future.

Regardless of the outcome of Iraq’s effort to forge a new government, it will not become a major regional military power again for at least a decade. If the United States is to have any major strategic partner in the Gulf, it is going to be Saudi Arabia.

As General David Petraeus and others have explained, the war against terrorism and extremism is going to be a long war, likely to go on for the next 10 to 20 years. The Gulf region is going to be one of the centers of this conflict. Al Qa’ida is not suddenly going away, and new organizations are certain to emerge. Nations like Yemen and Somalia present serious long-term risks of becoming centers of terrorist activity.

The United States faces growing pressures to limit its military spending and commitments, and it has steadily increasing needs for regional allies with strong and interoperable forces to deter and contain regional threats and fight alongside U.S. forces if necessary.

It may or may not be possible to move forward quickly in an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, but it is vital to minimize the tensions between our Arab allies and Israel. King Abdullah’s peace plan may differ sharply with Israel’s position, but it shows that the United States can sell arms to Saudi Arabia with minimal risk of this impacting on Israel’s security. In fact, strong U.S. security ties to Saudi Arabia offer Israel a far better alternative than Saudi Arabia turning to European or other suppliers and questioning U.S. support if it faces a crisis with Iran.

#### No Iran Saudi war--Iran knows it won’t win

Yevgeny **Satanovsky**, President of the Institute for Middle Eastern Studies 8/16/**10** Israeli-Palestinian tensions – prelude to the war against Iran http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100816/160222712.html

Recently Iran has been waging a proxy war against Israel, using the Arabs as its intermediaries. The two most recent military campaigns attest to this: the second Lebanese war and the Cast Lead operation in Gaza. These were actually Iranian-Israeli wars. Iran always tries to wage its wars on foreign soil and with minimal losses for itself. It doesn’t care that Arab fighters were killed in these hostilities – the important thing is that no Iranian lives were lost. Today Iran is also at war with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And in this case Israel is just a pretext for rallying behind Ayatollah Khamenei, who has proclaimed himself the main challenger to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose recent re-election caused turmoil in the Islamic Republic. But Iran will never take on Saudi Arabia or Egypt in a one-to-one fight.

#### No proxy war escalation – military costs

**White 11** [Gregory, The Business Insider. March 16, 2011. “What’s Really Happening in Bahrain and Why it Matters”]

It appears Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are willing to go the distance in terms of crushing protests in the country. Iran will continue to flap its wings, but will likely be constrained from acting due to the high military costs of any endeavor

### Prolif

#### No Senkaku or Asian conflict- empirically denied, economic interdependence checks, and China avoids nationalism.

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At times in the past few months, China and Japan have appeared almost ready to do battle over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands --which are administered by Tokyo but claimed by both countries -- and to ignite a war that could be bigger than any since World War II. Although Tokyo and Beijing have been shadowboxing over the territory for years, the standoff reached a new low in the fall, when the Japanese government nationalized some of the islands by purchasing them from a private owner. The decision set off a wave of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. In the wake of these events, the conflict quickly reached what political scientists call a state of equivalent retaliation -- a situation in which both countries believe that it is imperative to respond in kind to any and all perceived slights. As a result, it may have seemed that armed engagement was imminent. Yet, months later, nothing has happened. And despite their aggressive posturing in the disputed territory, both sides now show glimmers of willingness to dial down hostilities and to reestablish stability. Some analysts have cited North Korea's recent nuclear test as a factor in the countries' reluctance to engage in military conflict. They argue that the detonation, and Kim Jong Un's belligerence, brought China and Japan together, unsettling them and placing their differences in a scarier context. Rory Medcalf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that "the nuclear test gives the leadership in both Beijing and Tokyo a chance to focus on a foreign and security policy challenge where their interests are not diametrically at odds." The nuclear test, though, is a red herring in terms of the conflict over the disputed islands. In truth, the roots of the conflict -- and the reasons it has not yet exploded -- are much deeper. Put simply, China cannot afford military conflict with any of its Asian neighbors. It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country increasingly enjoys strategic superiority over the entire region, and it is difficult to imagine that its forces would be beaten in a direct engagement over the islands, in the South China Sea or in the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian border. However, Chinese officials see that even the most pronounced victory would be outweighed by the collateral damage that such a use of force would cause to Beijing's two most fundamental national interests -- economic growth and preventing the escalation of radical nationalist sentiment at home. These constraints, rather than any external deterrent, will keep Xi Jinping, China's new leader, from authorizing the use of deadly force in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over three decades, Beijing has promoted peace and stability in Asia to facilitate conditions amenable to China's economic development. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping repeatedly contended that to move beyond the economically debilitating Maoist period, China would have to seek a common ground with its neighbors. Promoting cooperation in the region would allow China to spend less on military preparedness, focus on making the country a more welcoming destination for foreign investment, and foster better trade relations. All of this would strengthen the Chinese economy. Deng was right. Today, China's economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng's grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won, and precariously held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising Chinese nationalism, although often seen as a promoter of conflict, further limits the prospects for armed engagement. This is because Beijing will try to discourage nationalism if it fears it may lose control or be forced by popular sentiment to take an action it deems unwise. Ever since the Tiananmen Square massacre put questions about the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern before the population, successive generations of Chinese leaders have carefully negotiated a balance between promoting nationalist sentiment and preventing it from boiling over. In the process, they cemented the legitimacy of their rule. A war with Japan could easily upset that balance by inflaming nationalism that could blow back against China's leaders. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a uniformed Chinese military member is killed during a firefight with Japanese soldiers. Regardless of the specific circumstances, the casualty would create a new martyr in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan. Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power -- damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China's "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China's commitment to "never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country's interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." Of course, wars do happen -- and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century. However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink. This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn't. Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However, it cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks in the sea. On the contrary, in the coming months it will quietly seek a way to shelve the dispute in return for securing regional stability, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora's box of rising nationalist sentiment. The ensuing peace, while unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.

#### No drones arms race – multiple checks

- narrow application – diplomatic and political costs – state defenses

**Singh 12** – researcher at the Center for a New American Security (Joseph, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, 8/13, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2TxEkUI37>, CMR)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.¶ This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active.¶ What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy.¶ In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region.

#### Realist theory disproves the advantage

JM Greico- professor of political science at Duke University, 1993 “Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate”¶ edited by David Allen Baldwin, chapter entitled “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” p. 116-118

Realism has dominated international relations theory at least since World War II.' For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on interstate cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions.2¶ The major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism. Prior to the current decade, it appeared in three successive presentations—functionalist integration theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, neofunctionalist regional integration theory in the 1950s and 1960s, and interdependence theory in the 1970s.3 All three versions rejected realism's propositions about states and its gloomy understanding of world politics. Most significantly, they argued that international institutions can help states cooperate. Thus, compared to realism, these earlier versions of liberal institutionalism offered a more hopeful prognosis for international cooperation and a more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states achieve it.¶ International tensions and conflicts during the 1970s undermined liberal institutionalism and reconfirmed realism in large measure. Yet that difficult decade did not witness a collapse of the international system, and in the light of continuing modest levels of interstate cooperation, a new liberal institutionalist challenge to realism came forward during the early 1980s (Stein 1983:115-40; Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985). What is distinctive about this newest liberal institutionalism is its claim that it accepts a number of core realist propositions, including, apparently, the realist argument that anarchy impedes the achievement of international cooperation. However, the core liberal arguments—that realism overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation—remain firmly intact. The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions.¶ This point is crucial for students of international relations. If neo-liberal institutionalists are correct, then they have dealt realism a major blow while providing ine intellectual justification for treating their own approach, and the tradition from which it emerges, as the most effective for understanding world politics.¶ This essay's principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory's optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong.¶ Neoliberalism's claims about cooperation are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating, the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists¶ find that states are positional, not atomistic, in character, and therefore realists argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation that they do. For realists, a state will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains. Realism, then, finds that there are at least two major barriers to international cooperation: state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements of gains. Neoliberal institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.¶ Realism's identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that states in anarchy fear for their survival as independent actors. According to realists, states worry that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result, states must give serious attention to the gains of partners. Neoliber-als fail to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy, and this allows them to ignore the matter of relative gains and to assume that states only desire absolute gains. Yet in doing so, they fail to identify a major source of state inhibitions about international cooperation.¶ In sum, I suggest that realism, its emphasis on conflict and competition notwithstanding, offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than does its latest liberal challenger. If that is true, then realism is still the most powerful theory of international politics.

#### drones make conflict less likely

Goure, 12

[Daniel, vice president of the Lexington Institute, Drones and the Changing Nature of Warfare: Hold the Presses!, CATO Unbound, January 13, 2012, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/13/daniel-goure/drones-changing-nature-warfare-hold-presses>, CMR] gender edited

Has the accelerated use of drones opened a new chapter in the history of warfare, as David Cortright asserts? If so, what is the title of that chapter? It certainly is not “Drones Make War More Likely, Indiscriminate or Bloodier.” As recent landmark studies by Goldstein and Pinker clearly document, societal violence in general and armed conflict in particular are on the decline.[1] The fact that we live in the historical shadow of the air raids on Dresden and Tokyo but are focused on a few hundred strikes by unmanned aerial systems in Pakistan underscores this dramatic change in the way air power is employed today. Drones are not new. The V-1 was a drone, but lacked a man-in-the-loop and precision guidance capabilities. Modern drones emerged from the overall revolution in precision navigation and networked communications which began more than two decades ago. This revolution centered on improvements in technologies for position location, remote sensing, automated flight controls, computer-based target designation, high bandwidth communications, high capacity computing and smart fusing. These technologies were combined to provide a capability for long-range precision strikes, as demonstrated in the first Gulf War. Most often this capability required both a platform/launcher and a “smart” weapon such as a laser-guided bomb or Joint Direct Attack Munition that would be flown to a release point, then fly to a specific target based either on laser illumination or pre-programmed GPS coordinates. Cruise missiles, which have been widely proliferated, are essentially drones. Modern drones provide many of the best features of both cruise missiles and manned aircraft. Most significantly, they provide the tactical and operational flexibility of manned platforms with the reduced risk to personnel associated with cruise missiles. Unlike the former, they allow for man-in-the-loop control and vehicle recovery. Unlike the latter, they can operate at altitudes and in environments unsuited to manned systems and, in some cases, for extended periods of time. Despite the proliferation of drones, particularly by the United States, at best it can be argued that the proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) is changing tactics, particularly with respect to operations on land. The predominant mission of drones today is to collect information, primarily electro-optical data in the form of pictures and full motion video. The overwhelming majority of drone flying hours are conducted by systems such as Aerovironment’s Wasp, Puma, and Raven; Insitu’s ScanEagle; and Textron’s Shadow for the purpose of providing overwatch for maneuvering Army and Marine Corps units. Even the vaunted Predator, a variant of which, the MQ-9 Reaper, is the platform employed for armed strikes, is predominantly employed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. The larger systems such as Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk and Lockheed Martin’s stealthy RQ-170 Sentinel are intended solely to gather intelligence. Armed drones serve a niche function. They are useful in situations where real-time tactical intelligence is required in order to launch a weapon and the operating environment is extremely benign. Because they can loiter in the area of a suspected target, waiting for positive identification and the proper time to strike with the least possibility of inflicting collateral damage, they are far less lethal than any other aerial weapons system. Attempts to connect an increased tendency to use force are supported neither by the evidence nor by logic. The frequency and intensity of conflicts has declined even as the ability to conduct remote combat has increased exponentially. There were only a handful of drones available to the U.S. military when Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom began. The lack of unmanned systems appears to have posed no obstacle to the decision to initiate either operation. It is difficult to accord any serious influence over the conduct of air operations in past or current conflicts to the presence of armed drones. In the era before drones, the U.S. imposed ten year long no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. In addition, the number of drone sorties in total is but a tiny fraction of all aerial sorties. Armed drone sorties constitute only a small fraction of total drone missions. Cortright notes that since 2009 there have been 239 drone strikes into Pakistan. However, for the month of January 2011, Coalition forces in Afghanistan flew 387 sorties in which guns were fired or munitions expended.[2] These statistics suggest a clear preference on the part of the military for manned aerial systems and not drones in the conduct of tactical air operations. Cortright also reports that 145 drone strikes were conducted during Operation Odyssey Dawn—the liberation of Libya. Actually this is an incorrect statement. While drones were used over Libya these were not armed flights, hence they were sorties and not strikes. But this is good example of the breathless quality of much of the analysis today of the implications of drones for warfare. Look at the numbers. The U.S. alone conducted some 3,500 sorties during Operation Odyssey Dawn. So drones amounted to 4% of the total. By the way, the United States and United Kingdom also launched 228 Tomahawk cruise missiles during this operation, 112 on the first night of the conflict. If we are to accord to weapon systems influence over the decision to use force then in the case of Libya, precedence must be given based simply on the number of sorties conducted to cruise missiles, aerial refueling tankers, tactical fighters, and even cargo planes before we come to the little-used drone. The availability of un[staffed]manned aerial systems in no way makes conflict more likely or more brutal. Quite the opposite, in fact, seems to be the case. The presumption that were it not for the availability of drones, the U.S. would refrain from conducting military operations against terrorists based in Pakistan is highly dubious. We have an example of an alternative military option: Operation Enduring Freedom. As Joshua Goldstein pointed out in a recent article, the use of armed drones in Pakistan may have prevented the use of far bloodier means. “Armed drones now attack targets that in the past would have required an invasion with thousands of heavily armed troops, displacing huge numbers of civilians and destroying valuable property along the way.”[3] According to Robert Woodward’s reporting on President Obama’s decision to deploy additional forces to Afghanistan in 2009, a number of senior advisors proposed a lower-cost, smaller deployment based on increased use of special operations forces and unmanned aerial vehicles. I might go even farther than Goldstein and argue that Cortright should advocate the greater use of drones, armed and otherwise, precisely due to his interest in reducing the frequency, intensity, and costs of conflicts. Just as dash cameras in police cars and cell phone cameras have led to a decrease in police brutality and the ability to bring those who violate procedures to account, the electro-optical sensors on drones can be used to increase oversight over military forces in the field. In fact, cameras can reduce what Cortright calls “the psychological distance that separates the launching of a strike from its bloody impact.” It can also help reduce the alleged isolation of the American people from the use of force in their name. Unfortunately in view of its title, the primary focus of Cortright’s article is not on drones and warfare. Rather, it centers on the subset of the role of drones in current counterterrorism operations. A number of the issues he raises are frankly much more relevant to the rather murky legal and operational circumstances surrounding the global campaign against al Qaeda. Cortright is closer to the mark when, as the title of his article suggests, he connects the nature of drones, notably the lack of a person in the cockpit, to the sense that both the George W. Bush and, most particularly, the Obama Administration saw such systems as supporting if not promoting a “license to kill.” Critics of the use of drones against unlawful combatants in Pakistan and elsewhere would be on firmer ground by connecting the disembodied features of “Nintendo warfare” to our seeming tolerance for the weakening of legal safeguards for criminal terrorists. In conclusion, I would suggest that there is nothing in the current employment of drones or in plans for future unmanned aerial systems that poses the kinds of dangers suggested by Mr. Cortright. They will not make war easier or cheaper. There is no evidence that armed drones have reduced the political inhibitions against the use of deadly force. The use of drones in no way threatens to weaken the moral presumption against the inappropriate or excessive use of force that is at the heart of the just war doctrine—the emphasis is mine, but the qualifiers have always belonged to just war theory. Mr. Cortright’s problem is not with drones but the policies of those who employ them. I almost hate to say it, but we should remember that drones don’t kill terrorists, governments do.

### Solvency

#### Internal and external accountability mechanisms are effective now---and they’ll stay that way as drone missions increase

Jack Goldsmith 12, Harvard Law professor and a member of the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law, 3/19/12, “Fire When Ready,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire\_when\_ready

In this new age of drone warfare, probing the constitutional legitimacy of targeted killings has never been more vital. The Obama administration has carried out well over 200 drone strikes in its first three years, and the practice promises to ramp up even more in the next few years as the United States decreases its footprint in Afghanistan and relies even more heavily on special operations and covert actions centered around the use of drones. There are contested legal issues surrounding drone strikes, and -- in contrast to issues like military detention and military commissions -- courts have not pushed back against the presidency on this issue. But judicial review is not the only constitutional check on the presidency, especially during war. Awlaki's killing and others like it have solid legal support and are embedded in an unprecedentedly robust system of legal and political accountability that includes courts but also includes other institutions and actors as well.

When the Obama administration made the decision to kill Awlaki, it did not rely on the president's constitutional authority as commander in chief. Rather, it relied on authority that Congress gave it, and on guidance from the courts. In September 2001, Congress authorized the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines" were responsible for 9/11. Whatever else the term "force" may mean, it clearly includes authorization from Congress to kill enemy soldiers who fall within the statute. Unlike some prior authorizations of force in American history, the 2001 authorization contains no geographical limitation. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the detention context, has ruled that the "force" authorized by Congress in the 2001 law could be applied against a U.S. citizen. Lower courts have interpreted the same law to include within its scope co-belligerent enemy forces "associated" with al Qaeda who are "engaged in hostilities against the United States."

International law is also relevant to targeting decisions. Targeted killings are lawful under the international laws of war only if they comply with basic requirements like distinguishing enemy soldiers from civilians and avoiding excessive collateral damage. And they are consistent with the U.N. Charter's ban on using force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" only if the targeted nation consents or the United States properly acts in self-defense. There are reports that Yemen consented to the strike on Awlaki. But even if it did not, the strike would still have been consistent with the Charter to the extent that Yemen was "unwilling or unable" to suppress the threat he posed. This standard is not settled in international law, but it is sufficiently grounded in law and practice that no American president charged with keeping the country safe could refuse to exercise international self-defense rights when presented with a concrete security threat in this situation. The "unwilling or unable" standard was almost certainly the one the United States relied on in the Osama bin Laden raid inside Pakistan.

These legal principles are backed by a system of internal and external checks and balances that, in this context, are without equal in American wartime history. Until a few decades ago, targeting decisions were not subject to meaningful legal scrutiny. Presidents or commanders typically ordered a strike based on effectiveness and, sometimes, moral or political considerations. President Harry Truman, for example, received a great deal of advice about whether and how to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it didn't come from lawyers advising him on the laws of war. Today, all major military targets are vetted by a bevy of executive branch lawyers who can and do rule out operations and targets on legal grounds, and by commanders who are more sensitive than ever to legal considerations and collateral damage. Decisions to kill high-level terrorists outside of Afghanistan (like Awlaki) are considered and approved by lawyers and policymakers at the highest levels of the government.

#### Drone production is fueling the aerospace industry – lack of regulation key

RT 12 (“Drone industry becomes a booming business”, 7/21, http://rt.com/usa/drone-business-defense-million-422/)

The winners are the drone makers, and much of the reason for that is the aggressive and powerful lobbying by the defense and aerospace industry. The drones of today have revolutionized modern warfare and are known for their seek and destroy missions over Afghanistan and Pakistan. The drones of tomorrow, however, will be humming over American homes. “There may be up to 30,000 drones flying in US skies by 2020, which is a huge number. Basically, one in every town,” said Trevor Timm from the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Now that Congress and the president have cleared the way for spy planes to fly in US skies, defense and aerospace firms are pushing their weight in D.C. in hopes of cashing in on the expected drone business boon. “Right now the global market is worth $6 billion but it’s supposed to double to over $11 billion within the next decade,” said a Andrea Stone, reporter with the Huffington Post. In 2001, the Defense Department had 90 drones. Just eleven years later, though, and it has an arsenal of more than 9,500 remotely piloted aircraft. With wars winding down overseas, most of those unmanned aircraft will be used domestically for surveillance and disaster assistance, raising safety and privacy concerns. “Why do you need drones against your citizens? That’s military weaponry? You’re police is not your military and we’ve lost that distinction,” said peace activist Maureen Cruise. “They’re the weapons manufacturers and they know we need war in order to be profitable so they buy Congress,” said Cruise as she demonstrated outside of defense contractor Raytheon. Defense and aerospace firms that build drones have spent millions of dollars on lobbying over the past year. Those efforts will help them secure government contracts, but lobbyists are also having a very heavy influence on the legislation and regulation over these unmanned vehicles. “That’s how it works here. They’re the ones who know it best and know what they want written into the legislation. That could be a real problem because they obviously have a vested interest,” said Stone. With billions of dollars in contracts, Northrop Grumman is one of the dominant players in the unmanned aircraft business, spending more than $4 million in lobbying in 2011. Raytheon splurged nearly $7.4 million on lobbying last year according to First Street Research, while General Atomics spent $2.3 million The San Diego-based company has signed 250 million dollars in contracts with Homeland Security since 2005. “The argument all the time by law enforcement is these drones are very cheap and they’re very effective, yet despite the huge potential for danger in the privacy realm for American citizens, it hasn’t been proven that law enforcement can use these safely and efficiently anyways,” said Timm. Quite the opposite – The Office of Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security characterized the quarter-billion dollar drone program along the southern border as highly ineffective recommending a halt to further drone purchases. A $176 million Navy drone recently crashed and burned in Maryland. “Right now, the Navy only has five of those craft that they are using. When you bring 500 more, you’re going to have more of a risk of crashes,” said Jefferson Morley, a writer for Salon.com. Despite the criticisms, influential leaders in Congress are helping the defense and aerospace industry write the rules and cash in on the coming drone revolution.

#### Plan limits the aerospace industry – targeted killing policy is driving it

Breslin 13 (Susannah – Forbes Contributor, “Why Women Don't Support Drone Strikes”, 8/20 http://news.zurichna.com/article/491f264846653316fd45301179a1759d/why-women-dont-support-drone-strikes)

“Should this nation be involved in targeted killings?” Cummings asks rhetorically. “Should those be our national policies? I think that’s an important debate to have. But I think a lot of times what happens is that the policy debate gets confounded by the technology. This country has engaged in targeted killings for a long time. Whether it’s the manned aircraft, or a sniper, or some other kind of weapon. And a UAV is just yet one more weapon in the arsenal of how we do targeted killings in this country. So I get a little concerned when people start making the technology the focus of the debate when, in fact, it’s not the technology that’s driving this, it’s the policy that’s driving this. And we need to decouple those, so that we don’t start limiting a technology that is otherwise going to revolutionize a lagging aerospace industry.”

#### That collapses the broader aerospace sector --- even small reductions spillover and tank air power

**Thompson 9** (David, President – American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, “The Aerospace Workforce”, Federal News Service, 12-10, Lexis)

Aerospace systems are of considerable importance to U.S. national security, economic prosperity, technological vitality, and global leadership. Aeronautical and space systems protect our citizens, armed forces, and allies abroad. They connect the farthest corners of the world with safe and efficient air transportation and satellite communications, and they monitor the Earth, explore the solar system, and study the wider universe. The U.S. aerospace sector also contributes in major ways to America's economic output and high- technology employment. Aerospace research and development and manufacturing companies generated approximately $240 billion in sales in 2008, or nearly 1.75 percent of our country's gross national product. They currently employ about 650,000 people throughout our country. U.S. government agencies and departments engaged in aerospace research and operations add another 125,000 employees to the sector's workforce, bringing the total to over 775,000 people. Included in this number are more than 200,000 engineers and scientists -- one of the largest concentrations of technical brainpower on Earth. However, the U.S. aerospace workforce is now facing the most serious demographic challenge in his 100-year history. Simply put, today, many more older, experienced professionals are retiring from or otherwise leaving our industrial and governmental aerospace workforce than early career professionals are entering it. This imbalance is expected to become even more severe over the next five years as the final members of the Apollo-era generation of engineers and scientists complete 40- or 45-year careers and transition to well-deserved retirements. In fact, around 50 percent of the current aerospace workforce will be eligible for retirement within just the next five years. Meanwhile, the supply of younger aerospace engineers and scientists entering the industry is woefully insufficient to replace the mounting wave of retirements and other departures that we see in the near future. In part, this is the result of broader technical career trends as engineering and science graduates from our country's universities continue a multi-decade decline, even as the demand for their knowledge and skills in aerospace and other industries keeps increasing. Today, only about 15 percent of U.S. students earn their first college degree in engineering or science, well behind the 40 or 50 percent levels seen in many European and Asian countries. Due to the dual-use nature of aerospace technology and the limited supply of visas available to highly-qualified non-U.S. citizens, our industry's ability to hire the best and brightest graduates from overseas is also severely constrained. As a result, unless effective action is taken to reverse current trends, the U.S. aerospace sector is expected to experience a dramatic decrease in its technical workforce over the next decade. Your second question concerns the implications of a cutback in human spaceflight programs. AIAA's view on this is as follows. While U.S. human spaceflight programs directly employ somewhat less than 10 percent of our country's aerospace workers, its influence on attracting and motivating tomorrow's aerospace professionals is much greater than its immediate employment contribution. For nearly 50 years the excitement and challenge of human spaceflight have been tremendously important factors in the decisions of generations of young people to prepare for and to pursue careers in the aerospace sector. This remains true today, as indicated by hundreds of testimonies AIAA members have recorded over the past two years, a few of which I'll show in brief video interviews at the end of my statement. Further evidence of the catalytic role of human space missions is found in a recent study conducted earlier this year by MIT which found that 40 percent of current aerospace engineering undergraduates cited human space programs as the main reason they chose this field of study. Therefore, I think it can be predicted with high confidence that a major cutback in U.S. human space programs would be substantially detrimental to the future of the aerospace workforce. Such a cutback would put even greater stress on an already weakened strategic sector of our domestic high-technology workforce. Your final question centers on other issues that should be considered as decisions are made on the funding and direction for NASA, particularly in the human spaceflight area. In conclusion, AIAA offers the following suggestions in this regard. Beyond the previously noted critical influence on the future supply of aerospace professionals, administration and congressional leaders should also consider the collateral damage to the space industrial base if human space programs were substantially curtailed. Due to low annual production rates and highly-specialized product requirements, the domestic supply chain for space systems is relatively fragile. Many second- and third-tier suppliers in particular operate at marginal volumes today, so even a small reduction in their business could force some critical suppliers to exit this sector. Human space programs represent around 20 percent of the $47 billion in total U.S. space and missile systems sales from 2008. Accordingly, a major cutback in human space spending could have large and highly adverse ripple effects throughout commercial, defense, and scientific space programs as well, potentially triggering a series of disruptive changes in the common industrial supply base that our entire space sector relies on.

#### Strong air power is critical to solve Chinese and Korean conflict – goes nuclear

Haffa 12 (Robert P. – Director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center. He is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy, holds an M.A. degree from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is an adjunct professor in the Government program at Johns Hopkins University, “Full-Spectrum Air Power: Building the Air Force America Needs”, 10/12, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/full-spectrum-air-power-building-the-air-force-america-needs)

Chapter 2 The Principal Security Challenges Facing the U.S. Military and the Air Force Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey stated recently that the world is more dangerous than at any other time in human history: “More people have the ability to harm us or deny the ability to act than in any time in my life.” The chairman elaborated by pointing to the proliferation of precision weapons—destructive technologies that are now available to a “wider and more disparate pool of adversaries.”[18] There is a fairly wide consensus regarding the scope and seriousness of these threats, but the implications for Air Force capacities and capabilities are not always transparent. This chapter outlines the most salient security challenges with the purpose of recommending an agenda for building the Air Force that America needs. China and Anti-Access/Area Denial Leading the list, China’s military buildup and advanced technological developments threaten America’s ability to project military power into the Western Pacific region and, thereby, to protect its interests and allies in this vital region. There is great uncertainty that China will be as successful in the future as it has been the past 25 years—a period marked by military modernization and doctrinal reform. We cannot predict with confidence China’s future because the Chinese themselves are unable to do so. However, China’s capabilities, if not its course of action, are clear and inform U.S. strategy and force planning. China is fielding modern capabilities and devising new concepts to deny U.S. military operations in the Western Pacific. These anti-access/area denial capabilities are designed to prevent the U.S. from operating in the region as planned, specifically from forward land bases within relatively short range of the Taiwan Strait, the presumed nexus of conflict. To deny these bases to the U.S. and to threaten sea basing as well, the Chinese are investing in precision-guided surface-to-surface and anti-ship ballistic missiles, highly accurate land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, kinetic and directed-energy anti-satellite weapons, electronic and cyber-attack systems, ground and sea-based defenses of their critical infrastructure, and fourth-generation and possibly fifth-generation fighter aircraft.[19] The 2011 DOD report to Congress on the rising military might of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a number of implications for the U.S. Air Force.[20] The January 2011 flight test of a prototype of the J-20, China’s next-generation fighter, highlights China’s ambition to produce a fighter aircraft that incorporates stealth attributes, advanced avionics, and supercruise-capable engines over the next several years. China is upgrading its fleet of B-6 bombers—originally adapted from the Soviet Tu-16—with a new, longer-range variant that will be armed with a new long-range cruise missile. The PLA Air Force has continued expanding its inventory of long-range, advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and now has one of the largest such forces in the world. Over the past five years, China has acquired multiple SA-20 PMU2 battalions, the most advanced SAM system that Russia exports. China’s aviation industry is developing several types of airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. These include the KJ-200, based on the Y-8 airframe, for AWACS as well as intelligence collection and maritime surveillance and the KJ-2000, based on a modified Russian IL-76 airframe. The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s space and counter-space capabilities. A PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations reinforced the importance of operations in space to enable “informatized” warfare, claiming that space is the commanding point for the information battlefield. PLA writings emphasize the necessity of destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance and communications satellites, suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the initial targets of attack to blind and deafen the enemy. PLA military writings describe the use of electronic warfare, computer network operations, and kinetic strikes to disrupt battlefield information systems that support an adversary’s warfighting and power projection capabilities. PLA writings identify integrated network electronic warfare as one of the basic forms of integrated joint operations, suggesting the centrality of seizing and dominating the electromagnetic spectrum. China is developing measures to deter or counter third-party intervention, including U.S. military action in the region. Although many of these capabilities were developed with a focus on Taiwan, they have broad applications and implications extending beyond a Taiwan scenario. China’s approach is manifested by its sustained effort to develop the capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that might deploy or operate within the Western Pacific. In sum, despite considerable uncertainty, China could emerge over the next decade as a major threat to U.S. security. With increasing anti-access and power projection capability, China’s military could provide the means through which the PLA could seek to replace the United States as the principal military power in the Western Pacific and move toward hegemonic political and economic status in the region. As diplomatic and economic competitions unfold, the mission of the U.S. Department of Defense must be to maintain a favorable military balance of power in the region to dissuade China from making any aggressive or coercive moves against U.S. and allied interests in the region. Iran and North Korea: Proliferation of Precision Strike and Nuclear Weapons Iran and North Korea also pose significant risks to American interests and international security because both countries have proceeded with ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs despite international sanctions. Even if sanctions successfully slow their nuclear programs, short-range conventional precision weapons—often referred to as guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles (G-RAMM)—could enable their military forces to mount precision attacks against American air bases overseas, making doubly difficult the deployment of short-range air forces into the theater of operations. Finally, the U.S. government has identified both states as sponsors of terrorism, and they are prime candidates to export primitive nuclear devices and precision conventional weaponry to non-state entities and proxies, such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. The proliferation of advanced military technologies may allow Iran to develop its own A2/AD capabilities—like China, but on a smaller scale with Iran’s capabilities tailored to the unique geographic characteristics of the Persian Gulf. A recent study of Iran’s growing A2/AD capability argued, “Iran’s acquisition of weapons which it could use to deny access to the Gulf, control the flow of oil and gas from the region, and conduct acts of aggression or coercion are of grave concern to the United States and its security partners.”[21] The study pointed to Iran’s growing A2/AD capabilities in four broad categories: ballistic missiles, possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); G-RAMM holding at risk U.S. and allied forces deployed to bases and ports in the region; weapons and systems designed to close or control the Strait of Hormuz, including fast-attack aircraft, mine-laying platforms, and anti-ship cruise missiles; and air defenses.[22] Iran has invested heavily in ballistic missiles as the primary means of launching conventional (with aspirations for nuclear, chemical, or biological) attacks at long ranges. In the near term, Iran’s missiles lack the accuracy for effective attacks against U.S. and allied bases and ports in the region or against the oil infrastructure in the neighboring Gulf states. Therefore, these weapons would be used to threaten mass attacks against population centers to coerce regional states to deny access to U.S. forces. Precision conventional weaponry is proliferating from a variety of sources. Armed with G-RAMM using commercially available imagery and geo-location, Iran and its proxies could effectively use guided weapons against fixed facilities, such as fuel depots, ports, and airfields. The dominant scenario in a clash with Iran is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with the declaration of a maritime “exclusion zone” that would deny access to U.S. and allied forces attempting to secure the maritime commons. To carry out this threat, Iran has acquired large numbers of fast-attack surface ships, land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, modern mines, diesel submarines, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that might be used in swarming, kamikaze-like attacks. Iran displays a sophisticated air defense system, although it has not yet acquired Russia’s most potent SAM system, nor integrated those defenses effectively. Iran has demonstrated proficiency in using obscurants and decoys and in deeply burying and protecting key assets, negating the effectiveness of U.S. air strikes with precision weapons. Iran’s future A2/AD capability will likely include more accurate and mobile ballistic missiles, WMDs, G-RAMM, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, mini-submarines, advanced UAVs, and integrated air defenses armed with state-of-the-art SAMs. In A2/AD, Iran is no China in terms of military capability, but it has advantages that China lacks, particularly in geography.[23] While China has much to defend in a vast region of the Western Pacific, Iran can focus on the 600 mile-long Persian Gulf and specifically the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint. Therefore, Iran can concentrate its growing A2/AD capabilities on a far smaller area if its objective is to make it too costly for the United States to project military power into the region. For the moment, however, an important similarity between Chinese and Iranian ambitions is that both appear content to capitalize on the proliferating precision weapons regime to strengthen their political and economic status in the region, rather than leveraging that increasing strength to launch military attacks. However, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) does not appear to share that reticence. A recent study by the Korea Economic Research Institute in Seoul concluded that North Korea’s offensive military strategy was superior to the defensive posture of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and that North Korea was building up its forces to underwrite its doctrine of “military first politics” under Kim Jong-un, its new ruler.[24] Rather than constructing an A2/AD capability to deter U.S. power projection, North Korea, faced with the formidable South Korean military on its southern doorstep, has instead adopted an offensive posture that threatens a preemptive strike to unify the peninsula on its own terms. In such a scenario, the U.S. military would become quickly engaged by virtue of diplomatic commitments and the 28,500 U.S. troops that remain in South Korea. U.S. operational plans call for the rapid deployment of American ground, maritime, and air power to the region. As those operational plans are developed and exercised, they need to account for the capacity and capabilities of a rogue state that dedicates much of its national resources and nearly all of its international prestige to its military forces.[25] North Korea has a million-man army, of which 70 percent is forward-deployed within 60 miles of the demilitarized zone. Counting reserves and irregulars, North Korea’s ground forces are twice the size of South Korea’s land army. Pyongyang has enough plutonium for six to eight nuclear weapons and has claimed that it has weaponized all of its fissile material. The regime is also pursuing a parallel uranium-based nuclear weapons program, which eventually could augment North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. North Korea has recently tested anti-ship cruise missiles and new versions of short-range, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The North Korean government has declared that South Korea is no longer the sole target of its missiles and WMDs. North Korea’s “four major military lines” of converting the country into a fortress, arming the population, increasing the sophistication of the military, and modernizing its military forces support the objective of communizing the entire peninsula. North Korea advocates a blitzkrieg strategy using a forward-deployed arsenal of self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launchers that holds the city of Seoul at risk. North Korea has forward-deployed roughly 40 percent of its 1,200 fighter aircraft to bolster its air raid capabilities in the initial stages of conflict. North Korea has adopted a “juche” strategy calling for a hybrid of Soviet-inspired conventional warfare with Mao’s unconventional guerrilla warfare. It has 120,000 special operations forces that are dedicated to asymmetric warfare. North Korea has the world’s third largest arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. North Korea’s military is increasing its ability to launch cyber attacks against American and South Korean forces. The military threat from North Korea should not be exaggerated. Experts and findings from war games point to its aging and outdated equipment, which could fall prey to the more sophisticated air forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea. In addition, South Korea has been very deliberate in responding to the North’s military provocations, such as referring to the sinking of the corvette Cheonan and the significant loss of life to the United Nations for investigation. South Korea has also developed an extensive defense reform program to improve its capacity to respond effectively to North Korean provocations. In addition, Seoul created a new Northwest Islands Command and deployed additional forces and sensors to the West Sea, the location of the Cheonan attack and artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Nevertheless, the provocations have continued, diplomacy has bogged down, North Korea’s nuclear capability has continued to increase, and its new, young, and untried leader is clinging to the traditional “military first” policy. Thus, South Korea and the U.S. continue to seek and implement measures that will prevent North Korea’s leaders from launching a more serious preemptive attack that could plunge the peninsula into war. These force planning contingencies should not be taken lightly. While the military balance measured against Iran and North Korea may seem to favor the United States and its allies when compared with the increasing capability of China, regarding these rogue states simply as lesser-included cases would be a mistake. RAND’s Project Air Force has conducted in-depth research on what they have defined as nuclear-armed regional adversaries: “countries that pursue policies that are at odds with the United States and its security partners, whose actions run counter to broadly accepted norms of state behavior, and whose size and military forces are not of the first magnitude.”[26] That research led to an important conclusion that deterring the use of nuclear weapons by either North Korea or a newly armed Iran “could be highly problematic in any plausible conflict situations…for the simple reason that adversary leaders may not believe that they will be any worse off having used nuclear weapons than if they were to forego their use.”[27] The implications of the RAND findings for this paper and for building Air Force capabilities and capacities is that the United States military needs to offer high assurance that it can prevent these would-be adversaries from using nuclear weapons, rather than deter them, as is the case with China. This calls for a modern conventional military force that in contested airspace can hold at risk enemy command and control, WMD, and their delivery systems. It requires high-caliber reconnaissance-strike systems that can locate, pinpoint, and attack hardened fixed targets as well as identifying and attacking targets on the move. In perhaps the most important difference between planning a force to prevent, rather than deter, active defenses will be required to destroy delivery vehicles after their launch, but before they can strike regional bases and ports. A final threat emanating from these nuclear-armed regional adversaries is that they may proliferate precision-guided weapons and, perhaps, primitive nuclear devices to non-state actors dedicated to carrying out terrorist attacks against American and allied interests.

## 2NC

#### Surrendering ourselves to the state and abdicating personal responsibility makes extinction inevitable.

**Beres, 1994** (Louis Rene, Professor of International Law in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University, Spring,, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Lexis)

This, then, is an altogether different kind of understanding. Rather than rescue humankind by freeing individuals from fear of death, this perspective recommends educating people to the truth of an incontestable relationship between death and geopolitics. By surrendering ourselves to States and to traditional views of self-determination**,** we encourage not immortality but premature and predictable extinction. It is a relationship that can, and must, be more widely understood. There are great ironies involved. Although the corrosive calculus of geopolitics has now made possible the deliberate killing of all life, populations all over the planet turn increasingly to States for security. It is the dreadful ingenuity of States that makes possible death in the billions, but it is in the [\*24] expressions of that ingenuity that people seek safety. Indeed, as the threat of nuclear annihilation looms even after the Cold War, n71 the citizens of conflicting States reaffirm their segmented loyalties, moved by the persistent unreason that is, after all, the most indelible badge of modern humankind.

#### The 1NC’s rejection of violence is enough to garner alt solvency, our own thinking and behavior are the starting point for a liberatory politics aimed at analyzing the decision to act violently – through exposing the structures of thought deeply rooted in our everyday thinking that legitimize violence, we eradicate it.

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg. 6-7,ott)

The feminist critique of sexism, together with our early recognition of the necessity of raising our own consciousness, constitutes an understanding that ideology itself is a site of power and the abuse of power – that is, that our own thinking and, by extension, our own behavior are already a primary area for a liberatory politics. Moreover, a politics aiming at social equality and relations between equals should make it its central concern to reflect upon the structure of such relations – what it means to relate to others as equals. We have analysed and made a critique of abusive behavior, where men choose to treat women as unequals, or whites to treat Black people as unequals, being able to do so with sanctioned impunity. This would imply an analysis also of action and behavior which by contrast is based on choosing equality – in particular, choosing to grant equality to others, choosing not to violate others in situations which permit that choice, all the more so as it is our conviction that it is not people who are (by virtue of their ‘identity’) unequal, whom we then necessarily relate to as ‘unequals’, but that inequality is a matter of treating and being treated unequally. Conversely, we cannot assume that if there are two ‘equals’, their relations will necessarily be (or remain) equal. Rather, we should investigate how relationships of potential equality may, through the action of one or the other or both agents involved, be restructured into relations of dominance and submission. Action – and especially the will to power and violence – is a vital factor in the continually changing ‘structure’ of a relationship, combining with those factors we normally consider to constitute the structural context of the relation. This means engaging also with the discourses which construct violence as a phenomenon but obliterate the agent’s decision to violate. Our unwillingness to recognize the will of those who act violently as their will to act violently, our readiness to exonerate violent behavior by means of spurious explanations, not only betrays our primary identification with the subjects of violence and our lack of solidarity with the victims. It is itself an act of violence: the exercise of ideological violence, of the power of a discourse which legitimates violence, stigmatizes the victims, and treats people not as the agents of their own actions but as material for (‘our’) social policy. Ideology, however, is not just made by others; we are all of us subjects of ideology – as the producers of our own thinking and as the recipients of other people’s discourse – unless we resist such ideological structures of thought and discourse in a continual critique of ideology itself. A decision to violate is not necessarily synonymous with a decision to be ‘bad’ or to commit an injustice. Rather, we have at our disposal structures of thought and argumentation which make such a decision appear rational, justified or even necessary. These structures of thought are deeply rooted in our everyday thinking: they are part of the dominant ideology. We use them in our daily decisions for action – actions which are not necessarily acts of bodily injury and murder, of arson and larceny, and which do not necessarily unleash a major war, but which none the less are acts of violence: violation of the rights and integrity of other people, violation of their dignity and personhood, suppression of their freedom of choice and their self-determination, acts of objectification and of exploitation at every conceivable level – in- other words, war, on a small scale and against our nearest if not our dearest. What is remarkable is that this everyday behavior, in so far as it does not fall within the competence of criminal law, is hardly the subject of a serious theoretical discussion.4 Neither does it attract explicit legitimation; rather, the violence of everyday behavior draws its legitimacy from the ubiquity of such behavior in our society and the social consensus about its relative ‘harmlessness’ compared with other, that is, recognized forms of violence. That is to say, everyday behavior takes its orientation from the tradition of social practice, reproducing itself through recourse to the status quo. It is so naturalized, in fact, that it is not violent action which attracts attention, but any resistance to it: leaving a violent relationship or situations of violence, resisting bullying, pressure and blackmail, refusing to fight back.

#### We must view politics as an issue of personal choice because even if we can’t transform the world, this is the starting point for larger political movements.

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg.19)

Political action, in this view, is not something which will take place only in a more propitious future when circumstances have changed to much, or a revolution is already so far underway that it can take its course, and we as the ‘politically active’ people can join it. Nor can political action mean something we engage in only on condition that there will be enough others, or better, masses of them, who think as I do, and do what I want to do. Political action does not necessarily imply public mass actions whose massiveness will guarantee their success. For such individual conceptions of political mass action reflect the power thinking of generals commanding the troops of the ‘masses’ to suit their own strategies. Nor does it help to wish for the masses voluntarily to think as I do and to want what I want- that they be like-minded (like me), thus helping to fulfill my dream of a mass action. Even this has happened in the history of generals. My dream remains the dream of a commander who has like minded masses of volunteer troops at this disposal. Instead, we could consider that even our thinking is an opportunity for action, that it can be determined in this way or that, that it is the first opportunity, the first political situation, in which to exercise political choice. ‘We make the way possible, we allow it to happen’, says Drakulic. ‘We only have one weak protection against it, our consciousness. There are no them and us, there are no grand categories, abstract numbers, black-and-white truths, simple facts. There is only us- and yes, we are responsible for each other. And if we find this too minimal to satisfy our aspirations for political action and chance, why don’t we do it anyway, for a start?

#### The affirmative represents a politics of violence as a first resort – this is what necessarily means the alternative is mutually exclusive, violence affirms the existence of violence – a politics of personal responsibility to reject violence is necessary to change our societal consciousness.

Susanne Kappeler, Associate Prof @ Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, 1995, pg. 258

Resistance to violence however cannot consist of violence. Violence may change the direction of violence, invert the roles of violator and victim, but it necessarily affirms the principle of violence, whatever else it may achieve. And it adds new victims to the world — victims of our own making, not to mention more violent perpetrators, whose ranks we have decided to join. While in extremity and under the threat of our lives we may not have any means other than violence to secure our survival, most of us most of the time are not in such situations, though we glibly speak of ‘survival’. Instead, we would have ample opportunity in situations of no such threat to challenge the legitimacy of violence and to practice alternatives — above all by deciding not to use violence ourselves.

### Modeling: Ext1A—US Not Key 2NC

#### All their “precedent” evidence relies on the assertion that there’s a causal link between U.S. drone doctrine and other’ countries choices---that’s not true---no tangible evidence

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way:

Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat.

“Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.”

By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?)

It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so.

But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it.

Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

#### The idea that China wouldn’t have realized it could use drones to carry out strikes internationally absent the U.S. doing so, is stupid

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

It is indeed likely that the future will see more instances of uses of force at a much smaller, often less attributable, more discrete level than conventional war. Those uses will be most easily undertaken against non-state actors, rather than states, though the difference is likely to erode. The idea that it would not have occurred to China or Russia that drones could be used to target non-state actors across borders in safe havens, or that they would not do so because the United States had not done so is far-fetched. That is so not least because the United States has long held that it, or other states threatened by terrorist non-state actors in safe havens across sovereign borders, can be targeted if the sovereign is unable or unwilling to deal with them. There’s nothing new in this as a US view of international law; it goes back decades, and the US has not thought it some special rule benefiting the US alone. So the idea that the US has somehow developed this technology and then changed the rules regarding cross-border attack on terrorists is just wrong; the US has believed this for a long time and thinks it is legally and morally right.

### Modeling: Ext1B—Inev 2NC

#### Drone arms race inevitable

USA Today 13

(1/9, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/08/experts-drones-basis-for-new-global-arms-race/1819091/, “Experts: Drones basis for new global arms race”, AB)

The success of U.S. drones in Iraq and Afghanistan has triggered a global arms race, raising concerns the remotely piloted aircraft could fall into unfriendly hands, military experts say. The number of countries that have acquired or developed drones expanded to more than 75, up from about 40 in 2005, according to the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress. Iran and China are among the countries that have fielded their own systems. "People have seen the successes we've had," said Lt. Gen. Larry James, the Air Force's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The U.S. military has used drones extensively in Afghanistan, primarily to watch over enemy targets. Armed drones have been used to target terrorist leaders with missiles that are fired from miles away.

### Modeling: Ext2—No Arms Race 2NC

#### AND, the costs outweigh the benefits – reject aff alarmism

**Singh 12** – researcher at the Center for a New American Security (Joseph, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race”, 8/13, <http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2TxEkUI37>, CMR)

In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.¶ Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.¶ Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.¶ What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.¶ Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.¶ Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.¶ Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### No Impact - Checks in place now.

**Roberts, 13**

[Kristin, News Editor, National Journal, March 21, 2013, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321>]

The Obama administration appears to be aware of and concerned about setting precedents through its targeted-strike program. When the development of a disposition matrix to catalog both targets and resources marshaled against the United States was first reported in 2012, officials spoke about it in part as an effort to create a standardized process that would live beyond the current administration, underscoring the long duration of the counterterrorism challenge. Indeed, the president’s legal and security advisers have put considerable effort into establishing rules to govern the program. Most members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees say they are confident the defense and intelligence communities have set an adequate evidentiary bar for determining when a member of al-Qaida or an affiliated group may be added to the target list, for example, and say that the rigor of the process gives them comfort in the level of program oversight within the executive branch. “They’re not drawing names out of a hat here,” Rogers said. “It is very specific intel-gathering and other things that would lead somebody to be subject for an engagement by the United States government.”

#### No impact to prolif- no capability

Singer 13 The Proliferation of Drones, 19/06/2013, Peter W. Singer, director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institution, https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/proliferation-drones

Those worried about drone proliferation must face facts. We are no longer in a world where only the US has the technology, and we are not moving toward a future in which the technology is used only in the same way we use it now.¶ This means, in turn, that the frequent counter arguments to proliferation concerns have to catch up. Yes, only the US has a global basing and strike architecture (for now), but that is also irrelevant to most of the issues the proliferation presents. No, Turkey cannot strike Mexico with its drones, but then again it doesn’t want to. It can, however, reach into Northern Iraq, conduct a counter-terrorist signature strike, and then cite US precedent in Pakistan that would make for a sticky diplomatic situation. No, Hezbollah can’t fly its drones outside the Middle East. It has, however, demonstrated enhanced reach in the region with its own unmanned version of a mini-air force that has spooked Israel. Yes, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would find it difficult to gain and operate a Predator, but a terrorist has already planned to fly a drone into the Pentagon (he got the drone, but fortunately got caught by the FBI before he got the explosives), while hobbyists have already shown the ability to cross oceans with their drones. No, China can’t yet extend its power across regions into, say, Somalia like the US can. But it is creating the infrastructure – from the drones, to the global satellite navigation system it has built in Beidu, to its "string of pearls” strategy in the Middle East – that will eventually allow it to do so

### Modeling: Ext3--Realism 2NC

#### Biology proves

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76 //adi]

The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states arc forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. This environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits arc sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).